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I. INTRODUCTION

Recently, international courts and tribunals have faced the question of
when an armed conflict becomes international for the purpose of war
crimes prosecutions. Unfortunately, the most recent court to address the
question, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), criticized the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) "effective

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss3/3

2

Tyner: Internationaliztion of War Crimes Prosecutions: Correcting the In

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF WAR CRIAMS PROSECUTIONS

control" standard on state responsibility.' By criticizing the ICJ's
"effective control" standard, and in adopting a lower "overall control"
standard, the ICTY confused both its own inquiry as well as the inquiry on
state responsibility, and it failed to develop a useful test for determining
when a conflict becomes international for the purpose of war crimes
prosecutions. The drafters of the Articles on State Responsibility have not
sufficiently clarified the ICTY's error. In many cases, the scholarly
community has compounded the error by applauding the ICTY's lessening
of the ICJ's standard.2
Initially, the disagreement on the appropriate standard for state
responsibility seemed perfectly natural. Many scholars have long
criticized the ICJ's "effective control" standard for being too difficult to
meet.4 In addition, many seemed to see a direct conflict between the
standard discussed by the ICJ and the ICTY and applauded the ICTY for
taking a necessary step in making the standard for state responsibility
lower.' The ICJ and the ICTY, however, were attempting to do very
1. See infra Part III.B.
2. See infra Part III.E.
3. For an excellent history ofNicaragua,Tadic,and the general law on international armed
conflict, see Anthony Cullen, The Parameters of Internal Armed Conflict in International
HumanitarianLaw, 12 U. Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 189,222-23 (2004).
4. See Mark A. Drumbl, Symposium: The ICTYat Ten: A CriticalAssessmentofthe Major
Rulings of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalover the Past Decade: Looking Up, Down and
Across: The ICTY's Place in the InternationalLegal Order, 37 New Eng.L. Rev. 1037, 1050
(2003); see also Carsten Stahn, InternationalLaw UnderFire: TerroristActs as "ArmedAttack":
The Right to Self-Defense, Article 51 (1/2) of the UN Charter,and InternationalTerrorism, 27
Fletcher F. World Aff. 35, 47 (2003) (arguing that the Tadic standard represents "A viable and
reasonable alternative to the "effective control test").
5. See MuCHTELD BOOT, GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, WAR CRIMES: NULLUM
CRIMEN SINE LEGE AND THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 544, 554 (Intersentia 2002); see also Cullen, supranote 3, at 228-29; RACHEL KERR, THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: AN EXERCISE IN LAw,

POLTICS, AND DIPLOMACY 80-81 (Oxford University Press, 2004); Derek Jinks, State
ResponsibilityforSponsorshipof TerroristandInsurgent Groups:State Responsibilityforthe Acts
ofPrivateArmed Groups,4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 83, 88-89 (2003); James G. Stewart, Towards a single
definition of armed conflict in internationalhumanitarian law: A critique of internationalized
armedconflict, Vol. 85, No. 850 I.R.R.C. 313, 324-26 (2003); Shane Spelliscy, The Proliferation
ofInternationalTribunals:A Chink in the Armor, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 143, 164-68 (2001)
(though Spelliscy goes on to argue that the existence of a conflict is not central to his thesis); see
also Suzannah Linton, Risingfrom the Ashes: The Creationof a Viable CriminalJustice System
in East Timor, 25 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 122, 161-62 (2001); Marco Sassbli & Laura M. Olson,
The Judgmentof the ICTYAppeals Chamberon the Merits in the Tadic Case, 839 I.R.R.C. 733,
739 (2000) (recognizing a conflict but advocating for a similar and easier standard in all cases);
Robert M. Hayden, Biased "Justice:"Humanrightsismand the InternationalCriminalTribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 47 CLEV.ST. L. REV. 549, 568 (1999) (arguing that the U.S. "might
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different things. The ICJ was asked to hold a foreign state responsible for
the actions of non-state actors acting within another state. In contrast, the
ICTY attempted to determine the guilt of an individual for crimes of which
he was accused.
Though this new standard is not relevant to the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda,' the Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court still differentiates between international and internal conflicts.' The
question of what standard to use to determine when a conflict becomes
internationalized in war crimes prosecutions is, therefore, still relevant,
and it will remain relevant for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the ICJ
has faced and will continue to face questions involving state
responsibility,' so the question of what standard to use for state
responsibility remains relevant in the context of suits between states as
well. Due to the strong probability that other courts will confront similar
issues in the future, clarification of these standards is critical.

regret elements of the appellate decision in Tadic" specifically the change in the standard on state
responsibility).
6. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3, 4, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/ basicdocststatute/2004.pdf) (last visited July 14, 2005) (which
refers only to "serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and ofAdditional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977."). See
also THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE: ESSAYS 234, 265 (1998); RODERIC
ALLEY, INTERNAL CONFLICT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: WARS WITHOUT END? 123
(Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2004).
7. See Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/romestatute(e).pdf(last visited July 14,2005). See also
BOOT, supra note 5, at 553; INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARiAN LAW 89 (Rend
Provost ed., 2002) (Provost argues that the Statute of the ICC implies that individuals not connected
with a state cannot commit war crimes).
8. See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) (merits) (Feb. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketlibhy/ibhyjudgment/ibhyijudgment_20070226_frame.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007). This decision was released after this Article had been accepted for
publication but before it was published. In the decision, the ICJ criticized the ICTY's Tadic
decision and made many of the same arguments made in this Article. Id. at 144-45. In particular,
the ICJ criticized the ICTY for overstepping its jurisdiction, that "logic" did not compel that the
same test be used for the two different legal issues, and that the ICTY's test inappropriately
broadens state responsibility. Id. See also Leo Van Den Hole, Towards a Test ofthe International
Characterofan Armed Conflict: Nicaraguaand Tadic, 32 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & CoM. 269,28687 (2005); YUSUF AKSAR, IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: FROM THE AD
HOC TRIBUNALS TO A PERMANENT INTERNATIONACRIMINALCOURT 135 (Routledge 2004) (noting
that the ICJ lacks jurisdiction over individual criminals, meaning that its rulings have no bearing
on whether a conflict is international for the purposes of international war crimes prosecutions).
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Part II of this Article will briefly discuss the history of the conflict in
the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo as the International
Criminal Court has issued an indictment in one case and is weighing
indictments in others for war crimes in that area. Part I will explore the
history of the Tadic decision, starting with the ICJ's Nicaraguaholding,
including an exploration of the goals of the Nicaraguan government in
bringing the case. Part Ill of this Article also addresses the Tadic case,
again focusing on the goals of the Tribunal, by discussing how the ICTY's
"overall control" standard developed in that Tribunal, by addressing the
International Law Commission's (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility,
and by providing two views developed in the scholarly literature. Part IV
fully addresses how and why the ICTY erred. It argues that because the
different courts did not address the same issue, different standards are
appropriate. Furthermore, Part IV argues that the ICTY's repudiation of
the ICJ needlessly complicated an otherwise clear-cut issue. In addition,
this Article evaluates whether the ICTY's test is a good test for
determining when a conflict becomes international for the purpose of war
crimes prosecutions. It then provides an alternate standard and, with the
use of hypothetical scenarios drawn from the Ituri conflict in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), shows why a standard specifically
developed for determining when a conflict has become international for
the purpose of war crimes prosecutions is superior to the general standard
developed by the ICTY.
II. THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ITURI CONFLICT BY THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT

According to a court press release, the International Criminal Court
(ICC) has been investigating "crimes allegedly committed on the territory"
of the DRC since July 1, 2002, the date the Rome Statute came into force.9
The ICC Prosecutor's investigation focused initially on "crimes committed
in the Ituri region," but the investigation's focus has apparently expanded
to other areas of the DRC.'0
The conflict in the Ituri region, much like the conflict in the rest of the
DRC is immensely complicated and confusing.' The Ituri conflict
9. Press Release, International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court Opens its First Investigation (June 23, 2004), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id=26&l=en.html (last visited September 11, 2005)
(hereinafter ICC Press Release).
10. Seeid.
11. Human Rights Watch, Background to the Hema-Lendu Conflict in Uganda-Controlled
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primarily relates to an inter-ethnic conflict between the Lendu and the
Hema. 2 Various other armed groups, though, fought in the region during
the second civil war of the DRC.' 3 In particular, the Ugandan military and
various militia groups at times backed by Uganda, and at times fighting
against Uganda have been involved in this conflict.' 4
According to Human Rights Watch, in the late 1990's the Ugandan
military trained members of both the Lendu and Hema tribes. 5 Both the
Ugandan military and a militia group formed by these trainees, the
Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML) 16 had
nominal control over the DRC province of Orientale, 17 of which the Ituri
district is a part.' 8 In the first part of this decade, reports surfaced that the
Ugandan military officers responsible for training recruits of the RCD-ML
started favoring Hema trainees. 9 This reported favoritism led to the Lendu
recruits leaving the RCD-ML and forming their own rival militias.2 °
Rwanda also reportedly trained and supported a rival rebel group, the
Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-GOMA) in a bid to increase
its influence in the region.2 ' Evidence exists that the Rwandan military, at
the very least, provided aid and training (including ammunition), and that
it possibly had extensive direction and control over the RCD-GOMA
fighters in the area, including, coordinated missions between RCD-GOMA

Congo (2001), availableat http://www.hrw.orgtbackgrounder/africa/hemabckg.htm (last visited
September 11, 2005) (hereinafter Hema-Lendu Conflict Background).
12. Id.
13. Human Rights Watch, Ituri: "Covered in Blood" Ethnically Targeted Violence in
Northeastern DR Congo, Vol. 15, No. 11, at 5-18 (July 2003), availableat http://hrw.org/reports/
2003/ituri0703/DRC0703.pdf [hereinafter Ituri Report].
14. See Hema-Lendu Conflict Background, supra note 11.

15. Id.
16. Human Rights Watch describes RCD-ML as follows:
Also known as RCD-Kisangani, the RCD-ML was launched in September 1999

in Kampala when Wamba dia Wamba split from the RCD-Goma. Backed at the
start by Uganda, the RCD-ML has been fractured by leadership struggles and infighting. The current leader, Mbusa Nyamwisi took power after ousting Wamba
dia Wamba. The RCD-ML's military wing is the Congolese Popular Army (APC).
The RCD-ML entered into the Sun City agreement of April 2002 and the APC are
now being trained and armed by Kinshasa.
Ituri Report, supra note 13, at 14.
17. See id. at ii.
18. See id.at iii.
19. See Hema-Lendu Conflict Background, supra note 11.
20. See id.

21. Ituri Report, supra note 13, at 10-11.
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fighters and the Rwandan military.22 The RCD-GOMA reportedly has
links with the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), 23 a local Hema
dominated militia that, for a time, controlled some of the major areas of
Ituri, including the city of Bunia.24 Members of the UPC, in addition to
most other parties to this conflict, have been implicated in massive human
rights abuses, including mass-murder, genocide,
mass rape and other
2
sexual violence, torture, and forced labor.
Though the ICC's mandate is not limited to the conflict in Ituri, 26 the
clear involvement of foreign states in this area of the DRC makes it almost
inevitable that the ICC will be forced to determine at what point, if any,
the conflict in Ituri was international. Because the ICC is not constrained
by any other court's decision on determining when a conflict becomes
international, it has the opportunity to break new ground in this area. In
determining the appropriate standard, however, it will undoubtedly look
to what other courts have done in the past. A historical understanding of
how different courts have handled the internationalization of conflicts is,
therefore, necessary.
Ill. DEVELOPING STANDARDS FOR THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF CONFLICTS

A. Nicaragua v. United States of America
On June 27, 1986, the ICJ released its merits opinion in the landmark
case of Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and against Nicaragua
22. See id.

23. See id.
at 21, graphic entitled Web of Alliances in Ituri.
24. Human Rights Watch describes the UPC as follows:
Purportedly launched to promote reconciliation, the UPC quickly became a
predominately Gegere-led political party intent on promoting the interests of the
Hema and related Gegere. It came to power in Bunia in August 2002 with the help
of the Ugandans and used Hema militia as part of its armed forces. It turned to
Rwanda for support and formed an alliance with the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma
after being excluded by the RCD-ML and the MLC from the Mambasa ceasefire
talks in December 2002. Having turned from Uganda politically, the UPC was
ousted from Bunia by the Ugandan army in March 2003 but fought its way back
into town in May.
Id.at 15.
25. See generally id.
26. See ICC Press Release, supra note 9.
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(Nicaraguav. United States of America).27 In that case, the Sandinista
government of Nicaragua sought to hold the United States responsible for
the acts of the rebel Contras.2" The ICJ first rejected the U.S. attempts to
avoid its jurisdiction and evaluated the merits of the case.29 The ICJ,
though, refused to attribute the actions of the Contras to the United States
because, in the ICJ's eyes, the United States lacked the necessary
"effective control" over the Contras.3" This "effective control" standard
was among the first articulations of a test to 3determine when actions of
non-state actors could be attributed to a state. '
1. Background on the Case
The U.S. government consistently opposed the Sandinista government
of Nicaragua due to its leftist policies and its close relations with the
Soviet Union and Cuba. 32 The United States used many different methods
in an attempt to undermine the regime, including cutting off aid, leading
a trade embargo, and supporting counter-revolutionary forces, including
the Contras. 3 The United States also used Unilaterally Controlled Latino
Assets or UCLAs to engage in covert actions, including mining
Nicaragua's main export harbor.34 In 1984, Nicaragua brought suit against
the United States in an attempt to hold it responsible for violations of
international law due to its mining of the harbor as well as its support of
the Contras.35

27. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits,
1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/
inus/inusijudgmentinus ijudgment_19860627.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2007) [hereinafter
Nicaragua], For a good general discussion and background on the Nicaragua case, see also
THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 7-9

(1987).
28. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. Rep.

15.

29. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.),
Jurisdiction, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 392
11 (Nov. 26, 1984), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/icases/inusinusijudgmentlinusijudgment_19841126.pdf (last visited Mar. 25,
2007).
30. See Nicaragua, 110-116.
31. See id.
32. See InfoPlease Encyclopedia, Article on Nicaraguan History, available at http:I/www.
infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0859996.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2005) [hereinafter
Nicaragua History]. See also Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 15,at 18-19.
33. See Nicaragua History, supra note 32. See also Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 15, at 1819.
34. See Nicaragua History, supra note 32. See also Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 81, at 48.
35. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 15, at 18-19.
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2. Background on the Relevant Allegations
The Nicaraguan government argued that the U.S. intervention in
Nicaragua through its use of UCLAs and its support of the Contras
constituted unlawful intervention in its affairs.36 The Nicaraguan
government also argued that both the Contras and the UCLAs were either
direct agents or de facto agents ofthe U.S. government, making the United
States itself responsible for the acts of those groups." Nicaragua asserted
that because U.S. agents violated the Geneva Conventions, and because the
United States' involvement made this conflict an armed conflict between
two states, the Nicaraguan government deserved monetary damages from
the United States.3" Since the United States rejected the ICJ's holding on
jurisdiction, the United States did not argue the merits of the case.3 9
3. Relevant Law on State Responsibility
As far as the UCLAs were concerned, the ICJ had little trouble
determining that the United States was responsible for their actions.4" The
ICJ determined that they were agents of the United States acting on its
orders in such acts as the mining of the harbor. 4' As a result, the ICJ
determined that the United States was liable to Nicaragua for the UCLAs'
illegal acts and that the U.S. actions constituted unlawful intervention in
Nicaragua's affairs.42
The ICJ came to a striking conclusion with regard to the question of
whether the United States was responsible for the acts of the Contras.43 It
held that U.S.:

36. See id
37. See id M 110-116, at 62-65.
38. See id. 15, at 18-19.
39. See id. 10, at 17 ("The United States is constrained to conclude that the judgment of the
Court was clearly and manifestly erroneous as to both fact and law. The United States remains
firmly of the view, for the reasons given in its written and oral pleadings that the Court is without
jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, and that the Nicaraguan application of 9 April 1984 is
inadmissible. Accordingly, it is my duty to inform you that the United States intends not to

participate in any further proceedings in connection with this case and reserves its rights in respect
of any decision by the Court regarding Nicaragua's claims.") (quoting the United States

representative).
40. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 86, at 50.
41. See id.

42. See id. at 146-50.
43. See id. 110, at 62.
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participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing,
organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the
selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of
the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in itself, on the basis
of the evidence in the possession of the Court, for the purpose of
attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contrasin
the course of their military or paramilitary operations in
Nicaragua."
According to the ICJ in Nicaragua, the actions of the Contras were,
therefore, not the responsibility of the United States.45 As a result, the
United States was not liable for damages to the Nicaraguan government
for the violations of the Contras."
Interestingly, the ICJ was careful to draw a distinction between denying
the Nicaraguan government's request to hold the United States responsible
for the Contras' actions and the question of whether the Contras
themselves engaged in the specified actions:
What the Court has to investigate is not the complaints relating to
alleged violations of humanitarian law by the contras, regarded by
Nicaragua as imputable to the United States, but rather unlawful
acts for which the United States may be responsible directly in
connection with the activities of the contras. The lawfulness or
otherwise of such acts of the United States is a question different
from the violations of humanitarian law of which the contras may
or may not have been guilty. It is for this reason that the Court does
not have to determine whether the violations of humanitarian law
attributed to the contras were in fact committed by them.47
The question of the Contras' liability for their actions and the question of
whether the United States was liable for the conduct of the Contras were,
in the eyes of the ICJ, distinct and separate questions that likely would
require different analyses.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id. 115, at 54.
See Nicaragua,1986 I.C.J. Rep.
See id.
Id.
Seeid. 116,at 65.
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B. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic
One and a half decades after Nicaragua,the Appeals Chamber of the
ICTY released its judgment in the case of Prosecutorv. Dusko Tadic. 49 In
that case, the Appeals Chamber rejected the Nicaragua standard of
"effective control," finding that the standard was not logical given the
goals of the law on state responsibility.50 The Appeals Chamber also found
that the effective control standard was at variance with judicial and state
practice."1 Consequently, the Appeals Chamber adopted a lower standard
of state responsibility, the "overall control" standard, and used this
standard to uphold Tadic's conviction for crimes against humanity, as well
as other serious crimes.52 Subsequent decisions in the ICTY have solidified
and further developed this new and less stringent test for state
responsibility.
1. History of the ICTY
The Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia to address ethnic cleansing and other atrocities
committed during the war in the Balkans. The goal of the Tribunal, like the
Nuremberg Tribunal, was to punish individual wrongdoers guilty of
violations of international humanitarian law as established in the Geneva
Conventions and Customary International Law, as well as those guilty of
committing crimes against humanity.53 The ICTY's mandate never
extended so far as to determine whether a state was responsible for the
actions of any of the individuals charged with war crimes.

49. Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadic Appeal]. The full
text of the judgment is available at the ICTY's Internet Home Page, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf(last visited Sept. 22,2005). For
a good general discussion of the pertinent issues the Appeals Chamber raises, see Michael P.
Scharf, Trial and Error: An Assessment of the First Judgment of the Yugoslavia War Crimes

Tribunal, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL 167, 195-98 (1998).
50. See Tadic Appeal, supra note 49, 131, at 47-59.
51. See id at 47-56.

52. Seeid. 156, at69.
53. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT 94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 3-4 (July 14, 1997)
[hereinafter Tadic Trial], available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/udgement/tadsj970714e.pdf) (last visited Sept. 22, 2005). For a good summary of the Yugoslav conflict,
background on the Tribunal, and the Tadicjudgment, see Kristijan Zic, TheInternational Criminal
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslovia: Applying International Law to War Criminals, 16 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 507 (1998).
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2. Background on the Tadic Case
Dusko Tadic was a former cafd owner who became embroiled in Serb
Nationalism.' During the war in the Balkans,55 he was accused of beating
and murdering several prisoners,56 and reportedly ran one of the prison
camps in which atrocities took place." Because of his participation in
these and other crimes, the ICTY indicted, tried, and convicted him for
various offenses including breaches of the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity.5
3. Background on the Relevant Charges
The charges that instigated both this discussion and the Appeals
Chamber's eventual break with the International Court of Justice stem
from Article Two of the ICTY's Statute.5 9 This section of the statute
authorizes the Tribunal "to prosecute persons committing or ordering
54. See Tadic Trial, supra note 53, 3-4.
55. See generallyid. See also Indictment ofDusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I (Dec. 14,1995)
[hereinafter Tadic Indictment], available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/tad2ai951214e.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2005).
56. See generally Tadic Trial, supra note 53; Tadic Indictment, supranote 55.
57. See generally Tadic Trial, supra note 53; Tadic Indictment, supranote 55.
58. See Tadic Trial, supranote 53, 2, at 1.
59. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (adopted
25 May 1993 by Resolution 827) (as amended 13 May 1998 by Resolution 1166) (as amended 30
November 2000 by Resolution 1329) (as amended 17 May 2002 by Resolution 1411) (as amended
14 August 2002 by Resolution 1431) (as amended 19 May 2003 by Resolution 1481), specifically
Article Two, the full text of which reads:
Article Two
Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing
or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, namely the following acts against persons or property protected
under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(a) willful [sic] killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) wilfully [sic] causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces ofa hostile power;
(f)
wilfully [sic] depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and
regular trial; (g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
civilian; (h) taking civilians as hostages.
Id., availableat http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat I1-2003.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss3/3

12

Tyner: Internationaliztion of War Crimes Prosecutions: Correcting the In

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF WAR CRIMES PROSECUTIONS

to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949." Dusko Tadic was charged with several violations of the Geneva
Conventions. 61 The Trial Chamber characterized the legal standard for
conviction as requiring a three-pronged test.62 The first and second prongs
were that the victims of the crimes had to be "in the hands of" (first prong)
a "Party to the conflict or [an] Occupying Power" (second prong).63 The
third prong was that the civilian victims not be nationals of that Party or
Occupying Power." Because only the second prong of the test is relevant
to this Article, this Article will not describe the Trial Chamber's
discussion of any of the other prongs in any detail.
The "Party to the conflict or Occupying Power" prong of the test asked
a simple question: could the party or parties committing the crimes be tied
to an occupying power or state different from the state of the victims?65 If
the link between the state and those perpetrating the crimes was not
present, then Article Two would not be available to the Prosecution, as
Article Two relied on the Fourth Geneva Convention," the relevant
portion of which only applied to conflicts between states.67
4. Relevant Holdings
The discussion on whether Tadic's paramilitary organization was a
party to the conflict occupied many pages of both the Trial Chamber's and
the Appeals Chamber's opinions. 6' The Trial Chamber's majority opinion

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
See Tadic Trial, supra note 53, 45-51, at 16-18 (charging Tadic with "grave breaches.").
See id. 578, at 200.
Id.

64. Id.
65. Id. M586, 607, at 204-17.
66. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html
menu3/b/92.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2005). The preamble to the fourth Geneva Convention
specifically lays out the requirement that two or more parties be engaged in a state of war for the
relevant portions of the convention to apply:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them.
Id,

67. Id,
68. Tadic Trial, supra note 53, M586, 607, at 204-17; Prosecutor v. Tadic, No IT-94-1-A
(July 15, 1999) (Opinion and Judgment) [hereinafter Tadic Appeal]. The full text of the judgment
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determined that the Nicaragua effective control test was the appropriate
standard and that the Prosecution had not proved a sufficient link to
convict Tadic of charges under Article Two. 9 Presiding Judge McDonald
dissented and argued that the majority incorrectly interpreted Nicaragua
and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) had effective control
over the Bosnian Serb Army.7" In a separate part of her opinion, Judge
McDonald argued that the effective control standard was inappropriate in
the Tadic case and instead advocated for a "dependency and control" test.7'
a. The Trial Chamber's Majority Holding
The majority of the Trial Chamber believed that the appropriate
standard for many of the Article Two charges hinged on whether the
Bosnian Serb Army's actions could be imputed to the FRY.72 To impute
those actions to the FRY, the majority believed that the Bosnian Serb
Army would have to meet at all times the effective control test developed
by the ICJ in Nicaragua." The majority did not believe that after the FRY
pulled out of Yugoslavia, sufficient direction and control of the Bosnian
Serb Army existed to find effective control on the part of the FRY.74 As a
result, the majority dismissed all of the Article Two charges against Tadic
that took place after Yugoslavia's exit from the conflict.7"
b. Judge McDonald's Dissent
Judge McDonald, the presiding judge, disagreed with both the
majority's conclusion as well as its legal standard.76 She believed that if
the Nicaraguaeffective control standard was the appropriate one, that the
Prosecution had proven sufficient control on the part of the FRY to find
is available at the ICTY's Internet Home Page, available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadicappeal/
judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2005).
69. Tadic Trial, supra note 53, 607, at 217.
70. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald Regarding the
Applicability of Article Two of the Statute, Case IT-94-I-T 292 (May 7, 1997) [hereinafter Tadic
Dissent], available athttp://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgementtad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf) (last
visited Sept. 22, 2005) (giving full text of opinion). For a good summary and discussion of Judge
McDonald's dissent, see Deborah L. Ungar, The Tadic War Crimes Trial: The First Criminal
Conviction Since Nuremberg Exposes the Need for a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal, 20
WHrrrIER L. REv. 677, 708-713 (1999).
71. See Tadic Dissent, supra note 70, at 297-99.
72. Tadic Trial, supra note 53, IM586, 607, at 204-17.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 285.
76. See Tadic Dissent, supra note 70, at 297-99.
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that the actions of the Bosnian Serb Army were attributable to the FRY at
all relevant times for the purposes of the trial."
Judge McDonald also argued that a lesser standard than effective
control was the appropriate standard.78 She argued, first, that Tadic and
Nicaragua dealt with very different issues,79 one of imputability for
monetary damages in Nicaragua, and one of individual criminal
responsibility in Tadic:
A determination of imputability was appropriate in Nicaragua,
where the moving party sought to determine fault and liability of a
State for the acts of the contras as against the United States, but is
not suitable here, where the issue of responsibility is solely for the
purpose of identifying the occupying power. This is recognized
even by the majority, which notes that Nicaragua "was concerned
ultimately with the responsibility of a State for the breach, inter
alia, of rules of international humanitarian law, while the instant
case is concerned ultimately with the responsibility of an individual
for the breach of such rules". The primary issue in Nicaragua was
whether the acts of the contras could be imputed so as to impose
legal responsibility for monetary damages on the United States. °
Instead, Judge McDonald believed that the commentary to Article TwentyNine of the Fourth Geneva Convention provided a more helpful standard
for gauging whether enough of a connection existed between the FRY and
the Bosnian Serb Army.8 Under this commentary, the Trial Chamber
would have disregarded the formal military structure and instead
concentrated on whether the local agents were carrying out the will of the
authority in question.8 2 Judge McDonald argued that this standard provided
sufficient basis to find an agency relationship necessary to support charges
under Article Two.83

77. See id. See also Dorothea Beane, After the Dusko Tadic War Crimes Trial: A
Commentary on the Applicability of the Grave Breaches Provisions of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 27 STETSON L. REv. 589, 598-99 (1997).
78. Tadic Dissent, supra note 70, at 297-99.
79. Id.; see also Beane, supra note 77, at 599.
80. Tadic Dissent, supra note 70, at 297.
81. Id. at 298-99.
82. Id.

83. Id.
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c. The Appeals Chamber's Holding
The Appeals Chamber did not agree with the Trial Chamber's
formulation of the standard for attributing the actions of the Bosnian Serb
Army to the FRY." First, the Appeals Chamber rejected the Prosecution's
contention that the differences in Tadic and Nicaraguaimplied different
standards.8 5 It rejected the Prosecution's argument, holding: "What is at
issue is not the distinction between the two classes of responsibility. What
is at issue is apreliminaryquestion: that of the conditionson which under
internationallaw an individualmay be held to act as a defacto organ of
8 s6
a State."
The Appeals Chamber also spent a good deal of time explaining why
the Nicaraguastandard was both contrary to the logic of the law of state
responsibility as well as against judicial and state practice. In its
arguments on the logic of the law of state responsibility, the Appeals
Chamber pointed out that state responsibility:
renders any State responsible for acts in breach of international law
performed (i) by individuals having the formal status of organs of
a State (and this occurs even when these organs act ultra vires or
contra legem), or (ii) by individuals who make up organised groups
subject to the State's control. International law does so regardless
of whether or not the State has issued specific instructionsto those
individuals.8"
The Appeals Chamber then cited several examples from the Mexico-U.S.
Claims Tribunal,8 9 the Iran-U.S. claims Tribunal, 9 and the European Court
84. Tadic Appeal, supra note 68, 115, at 47.
85. Id. 88-89, at 35-36.
86. Id. 104, at 41 (italics in original).
87. Id. 116-145, at 47-62.
88. Id. 123, at 51.
89. Tadic Appeal, supra note 68, 125, at 51 (citing United States v. Mexico (Stephens
Case), Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. IV, at 266-67). The Appeals Chamber
discusses the case as follows: "the Mexico-United States General Claims Commission attributed
to Mexico acts committed during a civil war by a member of the Mexican 'irregular auxiliary' of
the army, which among other things lacked both uniforms and insignia. In this case the Commission
did not enquire as to whether or not specific instructions had been issued concerning the killing of
the United States national by that guard." In this case, however, the member was part of a branch
of the army (even if it was irregular), therefore a strong argument could be made that these irregular
forces fall more closely in line with what was contemplated by Article 5 of the ILC's Articles on
State Responsibility which deals with the "conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of
governmental authority" given that the army, however it is organized, is a governmental unit.
90. Tadic Appeal, supra note 68, I 126-127, at 52-53 (citing Kenneth P. Yeager v. Islamic
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of Human Rights,9" in support of its position that the ICJ set too high a
standard of attribution in Nicaragua.
Instead, the Appeals Chamber proposed a standard of overall control.92
This standard, the Appeals Chamber argued, allowed for the flexibility

necessary in dealing with violations of the type dealt with by the ICTY.93
The standard also allowed the ICTY to find a sufficient link between
Tadic's army and the FRY to find him guilty of all charges under Article
Two.'

Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports, 1987, vol. IV, at 92). Yeager involved a
band of revolutionary guards that detained American citizens in a hotel, escorted them to an airport
and then robbed them. The Appeals Chamber argued that the Tribunal attributed the actions of
these guards to the government of Iran because they were acting as de facto agents despite the fact
that the government of Iran had not ordered them to conduct the raid. The attribution could just as
easily come from the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility Article 5, Article 7 (Excess of authority
or contravention of instructions), Article 9 (Conduct carried out in the absence or default of the
official authorities), Article 10 (Conduct of an insurrectional or other movement), or Article 11
(Conduct acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own) rather than Article 8. Indeed, it seems
most likely that the conduct in question fell under one of those other categories given the unique
situation in Iran and that the Revolutionary Guard became part of the next government.
91. Tadic Appeal, supranote 68,1128, at 54 (citing Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), Eur. Court
of H.R., Judgment of 18 December 1996 (40/1993/435/514)). The court, in this case, had to
determine whether the continued denial of property rights to the applicant by the governing
authority in the Turkish part of Cyprus was Turkey's conduct. Turkey claimed that it was not, but
the ECHR found otherwise and held Turkey liable for the loss of the property. The Appeals
Chamber argued that this attribution was similar to the others:
In reaching the conclusion that the restrictions on the right to property complained
of by the applicant were attributable to Turkey, the Court did not find it necessary
to ascertain whether the Turkish authorities had exercised 'detailed' control over
the specific "policies and actions" of the authorities of the "TRNC." The Court
was satisfied by the showing that the local authorities were under the "effective
overall control" of Turkey.
Id. While this analysis may, at first blush appear convincing, the level of control Turkey commands
over the northern part of Cyprus is likely enough to reach the standard elaborated by the ICJ in
Nicaragua. See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, A
PROBLEM ORIENTED APPROACH, 31-65 (2002). Plus, the fact that the ECHR used the phrase
"effective ... control" provides further evidence that the standards used in Nicaragua and the
standards used by that court were not substantially different.
92. Tadic Appeal, supra note 68, 131, at 56.
93. Id.
94. Id. 171, at 75.
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d. Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen
In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Judge Shahabuddeen
questioned whether the Appeals Chamber should directly challenge the
ICJ's effective control standard.95 In his view, the goal of prosecuting
international war crimes and the goal of holding a state accountable for the
actions of others required different tests.' Judge Shahabuddeen argued
that Nicaraguais consistent with a finding of internationalized conflict
because the ICJ determined in Nicaraguathat the United States illegally
used force or the threat of force against Nicaragua.97 Judge Shahabuddeen,
concluded that "[o]n the basis of Nicaragua, I have no difficulty in
concluding that the findings of the Trial Chamber suffice to show that the
FRY was using force through the VRS against BH, even if it is supposed
that the facts were not sufficient to fix the FRY with responsibility for any
9'
delictual acts committed by the VRS."
C. The ICTY's Development of the "Overall Control" Standard
Though the ICTY first developed the overall control test in Tadic, it
has used the standard in many other cases. As the Appeals and Trial
Chambers have used the new test, it has developed several criteria that
distinguish it from the ICJ's "effective control" test.
1. Aleksovski
The Aleksovski case was the first time the Appeals Chamber addressed
the question of whether its previous decisions were binding. 99 The defense
in this case raised the question of whether the Tadic overall control test
was the appropriate test for determining when a conflict became
international in character."° The Prosecution submitted that the overall
control test was the appropriate test. 0°' After determining that the principle
of stare decisis applied, in most instances, to both the Appeals Chamber'0 2

95. See id. (Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen) at 154-56.
96. See id. at 156.
97. See Tadic Appeal, supranote 68, at 152-54.
98. See id. at 154.
99. See Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Opinion and Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A
(Mar. 24,2000), availableathttp://www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/appeal/judgementlale-asjO0324e.
pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2005).

100. See id. at 37, 39-40.
101. See id. at 36-37, 39.
102. Id. 107, at 46.
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and the Trial Chambers," a the Appeals Chamber reaffirmed the overall
control test."° The Prosecution, however, made an interesting argument
discussed by the Appeals Chamber. According to the Appeals Chamber,
the Prosecution argued that: "had [the overall control test] been applied,
the Trial Chamber would have concluded that the acts of the HVO, were
attributableto Croatia."'°5
The Appeals Chamber, after rejecting defense arguments, reiterated its
understanding of what the ICTY was attempting to do in Tadic:
The Tadic Judgment was concerned, inter alia, with the legal
criteria for determining the circumstances in which the acts of a
military group could be attributed to a State, such that the group
could be treated as a de facto organ of that State, thereby
internationalising a prima facie internal armed conflict in which it
is involved.0 6
In essence, the Appeals Chamber adopted its earlier understanding of the
need to attribute the actions of the individual to a state in order to
internationalize the conflict." 7
The Appeals Chambers then proceeded to analyze the Trial Chambers'
use of the standard.' It determined that the Trial Chamber improperly
focused on the entity giving instructions or orders.' The Appeals
Chamber then held that the overall control test does not contain any
requirement that orders pass from a state to an individual. "0
2. Celebeci
In the Celebeci case,"' the Appeals Chamber first affirmed its earlier
rejection of the Nicaragua"effective control" standard in Tadic."2 Then,
applying Alekovski, the Appeals Chamber determined that there were no
103. See id. at 47-48.
104. See Zlatko, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, 134, at 54.
105. See id. 120, at 49 (emphasis added). The HVO is an element of the Croatian Defense

Council, which is the Croatian Army.
106. See id. 129, at 54.
107. See id.at 55-57.
108. Seeid.
109. See Zlatko, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, at 55-57.
110. See id.
111. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, and Landzo (Celebici Case), Case No. IT-96-2 IA(Feb. 20,2001), availableathttp://www.un.orgicty/celebici/appeal/judgement/cel-aj010220.pdf
(last visited Sept. 22, 2005).
112. See id.at 6-8.
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reasons that would cause it to depart from the Tadic holding in this case." 3
Applying the overall control standard, the Appeals Chamber determined
that the Trial Chamber used the overall control test rather than the
effective control test because the Trial Chamber did not require orders or
instructions from a state in order to determine that the conflict was
international in character." 4 Consequently, the Appeals Chamber rejected
the appellant's grounds for appeal on these points." 5
3. Kordic and Cekez
The Kordic and Cekez case was one of the most recent cases in which
the Appeals Chamber addressed the overall control test in any detail." 6 In
this case, the Appeals Chamber first upheld its earlier rulings with respect
to the application of the overall control test rather than the effective
control test." 7 The Appeals Chamber also reiterated its disagreement with
the ICJ on the level of control necessary to impute the actions of
individuals to states, despite defense arguments that the Appeals Chamber
confused individual and state responsibility."'
The major development in this case, however, comes from the Appeals
Chamber's discussion of the overall control standard. After affirming the
Trial Chamber's finding that an armed conflict existed at the relevant
time, '9the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber's finding that "a
reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond [a] reasonable doubt" that
the conflict was international in character. 2 ' In determining whether the
conflict had been internationalized, the Chamber focused on two
questions. First was their evidence relating to whether a state provided
"financial and training assistance, military equipment and operational
support," and second, did that state "[p]articipat[e] in the organisation,
coordination or planning of military operations?"''
The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber that evidence
related to both of these prongs was present in the record, and consequently,

113. See id.at 26.
114. See id. at 10-16.
115. See id. at 16.
116. See Prosecutor v.Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A (Dec. 17,2004), available
athttp://www.un.orgicty/kordicappeal/judgementcer-aj041217e.pdf(lastvisited Sept. 22,2005).
117. See id.at 82-83.
118. Seeid.9 300,at81.
119. See id. at 88-90.
120. Id. 369, at 96.
121. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, 361, at 94.
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it affirmed the Trial Chamber."= The above two-prong test represents the
first time that the Appeals Chamber crystallized its overall control test.
This case provided a clear, concise formula for what is required to
establish overall control. Prior opinions only indicated what was not
needed to establish overall control (i.e., that direct orders from a state to
the accused were not necessary to establish overall control).
4. Notable Trial Chamber Uses of Overall Control
Other than the above cases, several Trial Chambers have addressed the
question of whether the Prosecution established that a state had overall
control over the accused.'23 In the case of Naletilicand Martinovic,24 the
122. See id.at 94-96.
123. The Trial Chamber in Prosecutorv. Delalic andDelic(CelebicO, Case No. IT-96-21-T
(Nov. 16,1998), available athttp://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgement/cel-tj981116e.pdf
(last visited Sept. 22, 2005). This case provided a particularly interesting discussion on the rationale
behind using the overall control standard rather than the ICJ's effective control standard:
230. A lengthy discussion of the NicaraguaCaseis also not merited in the present
context. While this decision. of the ICJ constitutes an important source of
jurisprudence on various issues of international law, it is always important to note
the dangers of relying upon the reasoning and findings of a very different judicial
body concerned with rather different circumstances from the case in hand. The
International Tribunal is a criminal judicial body, established to prosecute and
punish individuals for violations of international humanitarian law, and not to
determine State responsibility for acts of aggression or unlawful intervention. It
is, therefore, inappropriate to transpose wholesale into the present context the test
enunciated by the ICJ to determine the responsibility of the United States for the
actions of the contras in Nicaragua.
231. With this in mind, we can consider a very important point of distinction
between the NicaraguaCase and the one here at issue. In that case, the ICJ was
charged with determining whether there had been a use of force in violation of
customary international law and article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter by the
United States against Nicaragua, as well as an unlawful intervention in the internal
affairs of Nicaragua on the part of the United States. This issue rests on the
predominant, traditional perception of States as bounded entities possessed of
sovereignty which cannot be breached or interfered with. More specifically, what
was in question was the incursion of the forces of one such distinct, bounded
entity into another and the operation of agents of that entity within the boundaries
of the other. In contrast, the situation with which we are here concerned, is
characterised by the breakdown of previous State boundaries and the creation of
new ones. Consequently, the question which arises is one of continuity of control
of particular forces. The date which is consistently raised as the turning point in
this matter is that of 19 May 1992, when the JNA apparently withdrew from
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Trial Chamber used the overall control test as a second basis to find that
The Trial
the conflict in question was international in character.'
Chamber's formulation of the test for whether overall control existed did
not differ in any significant respect from the Appeals Chamber's
discussion of the standard. 26
In Simic et al.127 the Trial Chamber determined that an indictment was
defective because it did not specifically identify which state had overall
control over the accused.'28 Additionally, in the Brjdjanin and Zupijanin
case, 29 the Trial Chamber determined that the Prosecution presented
sufficient evidence to satisfy the overall control test. 3 Other decisions by
the Trial and Appeals Chambers address various minor aspects of the
overall control test. Those mentions are too minor and too numerous to
discuss exhaustively. 3'
D. The InternationalLaw Commission'sArticles on State Responsibility

1. History of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility
The International Law Commission (ILC) has been involved in a
laborious process of codifying international law on the subject of state

Id. at 86-87. See also AKSAR, supranote 8, at 131 (noting that this discussion by the Trial Chamber
is consistent with Judge McDonald's dissent in the Trial Chamber in Tadic.).
124. Prosecutorv. NaletilicandMartinovic,Case No. IT-98-34-T (Mar. 31,2003), available

at http://www.un.org/icty/naletilic/trialc/judgement/nal-tj03033 1-e.pdf.
125. Id. at 61, 67. Interestingly, the Trial Chamber uses the two test formulation later adopted
by the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutorv. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A (Dec. 17,

2004), at 94, availableat http://www.un.org/icty/kordic/appeal/judgement/cer-aj041217e.pdf.
126. See id. at 67-69.
127. Prosecutor v. Simic, IT-95-9-T (Oct. 17, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/icty/
simic/trialc3/ udgement/sim-tjO3 1017e.pdf.
128. See id. at 37-38.
129. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T (Sept. 1, 2004), availableat http://www.un.
org/icty/brdjanin/trialc/judgement/brd-j04090le.pdf.
130. See id. at 62-66.
131. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Enver Hadzihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47, Decision pursuant to
Rule 72(E) as to Validity of Appeal, 11 (Feb. 21, 2003), availableat http://www.un.org/icty/
hadzihas/appeal/decision-e/030221.htm) (last visited Jan. 16, 2006). See, e.g., Prosecutor v.
Radislav Brdanin and Momir Talic, Case No. IT-99-36, Decision on Objections by Momir Tadic
to the Form of the Amended Indictment, I 52, 55(iv)(b) (Feb. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/brdjanin/trialc/decision-e/10220F1214869.htm) (last visited Jan. 16,2006);
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 101-01 (Mar. 3, 2000),
availableathttp://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialc//judgement/bla-tj000303e.pdf) (last visited Jan.
16, 2006).
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responsibility for the past several decades.' 32 The lLC's study of state
responsibility began in 1955 when a special rapporteur was asked to study
the question and provide reports to the ILC. 3 3 In 1962, the ILC established
a sub-committee to prepare a preliminary report based on the research of
the special rapporteur1 34 In 1975, moving at a lightning pace, the
subcommittee decided that the Draft Articles on State Responsibility
needed to address three separate aspects of responsibility.' 35 The first draft
of part one was completed and given to the ILC in 1980.136 In 1996, the
special rapporteur completed
work on parts two and three and provided
137
those parts to the ILC.
Though the drafting of the articles has taken quite a bit of time, the
articles themselves have evolved considerably in certain areas. 13 ' The ILC
recommended the articles to the U.N. General Assembly. 39 The General
Assembly took notice of those articles and accepted them in Resolution
56/83 on December 12, 2001, and provided them to member governments
for a comment process. 4 ° Recently, the ILC engaged in a process of
reading and reviewing the draft articles in an attempt to incorporate the
comments made by various member governments.' 4'
2. Article Eight
Article Eight of the draft articles attempts to address the question of
when states are responsible for the acts of private individuals. 42 Thus,
Article Eight attempts to codify the existing law on when private actors
should be considered de facto state agents, thereby answering the question

132. International Law Commission, Report on the work of its fifty-third session, A/56/1 0, at
29-32 (Apr. 23-June 1 and July 2-Aug. 10, 2001), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/
2001/2001report.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2007) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles].
133. Id. at 29.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 30.
137. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 132, at 31-32.
138. Compare first and second drafts, both drafts, available at http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/rciV
ILCSR/Statresp.htm#Draft/*2OArticles%202) (last visited Sept. 22, 2005).
139. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 132, at 32. The text of the resolution contained the draft
articles of the ILC.
140. Resolution 56/83 Adopted by the General Assembly on 12th December 2001
A/RES/56/83, availableat http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/rcil/ILCSR/A_56_83(e).pdf(last visited Sept.

22, 2005).
141. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 132, at 32.
142. Id. at 103.
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of when the conduct of those private actors is attributable to the state.'43
The latest draft of Article Eight now reads: "The conduct of a person or
group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international
law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions
of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the
conduct.'"4
The language of Article Eight itself does not seem to endorse the ICJ's

standard of effective control, in that the specific language of the ICJ was
not included in the draft article. However, the commentary to the draft
article does draw a distinction similar to the one expressed by Judge
McDonald in her dissent, 45 embracing the ICJ's understanding of state
responsibility as described in Nicaragua and rejecting the ICTY's
understanding of the concept. 46 The commentary criticizes the ICTY by
stating:
But the legal issues and the factual situation in that case were
different from those facing the International Court in Militaryand
Paramilitaryactivities.The Tribunal's mandate is directed to issues
of individual criminal responsibility, not State responsibility, and
the question in that case concerned not responsibility but the
applicable rules of international humanitarian law.'
Though the reasoning behind the distinction is not made explicit in the
commentary, the distinction made in the commentary establishes that the
special rapporteur did not see the connection
41 between the facts at issue in
Tadic.
in
issue
at
facts
the
and
Nicaragua
E. Scholarly Discussion on the Standards

Much has been written about the split between the ICJ and the ICTY
over the proper standard for attributing actions of private actors to a state.
Two views have emerged in the literature concerning the conflict. The
majority view argues that the standards advanced by the different courts
irreconcilably conflict. 149For the most part, this majority view also seems
143. Id.at 103-09 (both the Article and the commentary).
144. Id. at 103.
145. Id. at 103-09.
146. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 132, at 106-07.
147. Id.at 106.
148. Id.at 105-07.
149. See BOOT, supra note 5, at 554. See also Cullen, supra note 3, at 228-29; Stewart, supra
note 5, at 324-26; KERR, supra note 5, at 80-81; Sass6li & Olson, supra note 5, at 739; Hayden,
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to approve of the ICTY's standard, arguing that the ICJ's standard is too
high. 50 In contrast, the minority view argues that the standards are not in
conflict,'' but the minority view does not elaborate on this point in any
detail.5 2 Many scholars, regardless of whether they adopt the majority or
the minority view, recognize that the question of whether a conflict is
international in character is important for reasons beyond prosecution of
war criminals.'53 Some scholars advocate a flexible standard where
conflicts can have both international and non-international
characteristics.""
1. Majority View
To call this view the majority view is perhaps misleading as most
authors who accept that a conflict between Nicaraguaand Tadic exists do
not address the question in any elaborate detail, nor do they devote
significant analysis to the topic. 55 This fact, however, does not detract
from the large number of commentators who assume or embrace the fact
that the two different courts in Tadic andNicaraguawere in conflict when
it comes to state responsibility.
supra note 5, at 564-68 (arguing that the United States "might regret elements of the appellate
decision in Tadic" specifically the change in the standard on state responsibility); Jinks, supranote
5, at 88-89; Spelliscy, supra note 5, at 164-68; Linton, supranote 5,at 161-62; MARTIN DIXON,
TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (4th ed. 2000); Arturo Carrillo-Suarez, Horsde Logique:
ContemporaryIssues in InternationalHumanitarianLaw as Applied to InternalArmed Conflict,
15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1,101-02 (1999).
150. See Drumbl, supranote 4, at 1050. See also Stahn, supra note 4, at 47 (arguing that the
Tadic standard represents "A viable and reasonable alternative to the "effective control test").
151. Bartram S. Brown, NationalityandInternationalityin InternationalHumanitarianLaw,
34 STAN. J INT'L L. 347, 382-85 (1998); Geoffrey R. Watson, Symposium: The ICTYat Ten: A
CriticalAssessment of the Major Rulings of the InternationalCriminal Tribunal Over the Past
Decade: The Changing Jurisprudence of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former
Yugoslavia, 37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 871, 877-78 (2003) (quoting Meron).
152. Brown, supranote 151, at 382-85; Watson, supra note 151, at 877-78.
153. See AKSAR, supranote 8, at 131-33 (noting that the character of a conflict is relevant in
terms of the protections civilians receive under the Geneva Conventions, and also noting that
domestic courts must address the question when parties bring suits involving these types of
conflicts).
154. Christopher Greenwood, InternationalHumanitarianLaw and the Tadic Case, 7 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 265,271-72 (1996) (noting that Nicaraguaprovides an example that the same conflict
can have both international and internal characteristics).
155. See BOOT, supranote 5, at 554. See also Cullen, supranote 3, at 228-29; Stewart, supra
note 5, at 324-26; KERR,supra note 5, at 80-81; Sass6li & Olson, supranote 5, at 739; Hayden,
supranote 5, at 564-68; Jinks, supranote 5, at 88-89; Spelliscy, supra note 5, at 164-68; Linton,
supranote 5, at 161-62; DIXON, supranote 149, at 239; Carillo-Suarez, supranote 149, at 10 1-02;
Drumbl, supranote 4, at 1050; Staln, supra note 4, at 47.
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a. A Conflict Between Nicaraguaand Tadic Exists
In the majority view, the two standards conflict with each other. The
majority view sees the conflict as coming from a variety of sources. Some
see the ICTY's criticism of the Nicaragua standard as evidence that the
the conflict exists
standards are irreconcilable. 6 Others simply assume
57
did.1
one
that
indicate
to
seemed
because the ICTY
b. The Tadic Standard is the Preferred Standard
Though not all in the majority view take a stand on this issue, many
seem to indicate that the ICTY standard is more relaxed and more in line
with general international legal thought on the matter of state
responsibility.5 8 Many who see a conflict also argue that great powers like
the United States will come to loathe what they see as the erosion of the
ICJ's Nicaraguastandard.' 59 Even among those who do not seem to take
a stand, those who identify a conflict rarely criticize the standard as too
lax.)' Indeed, some scholars argue that once a conflict becomes
international, it should remain so for the duration of the conflict regardless
of whether the international parties withdraw,' 6' or, at the very least, that
the law should be flexible with respect to the characterization of
conflicts. 62 One scholar calls for an end to the distinction between
international and internal conflicts, arguing that one standard would "better
account for the intricacies of internationalized warfare."' 63

156. See BOOT, supranote 5,at 554. See also Cullen, supranote 3, at 228-29; Stewart, supra
note 5,324-26; KERR, supranote 5, at 80-81; Sass6li & Olson,supranote 5,at 739; Hayden, supra
note 5, at 564-68; Jinks, supra note 5, at 88-89; Spelliscy, supra note 5, at 164-68; Linton, supra
note 5, at 161-62; DIXON, supra note 149, at 239; Carillo-Suarez, supra note 149, at 101-02.
157. See Drumbl, supra note 4, at 1050. See also Stahn, supra note 4, at 47.
158. See BOOT, supranote 5, at 554. See also KERR, supra note 5, at 80-81; Sass6li & Olson,
supranote 5,at 739; Jinks, supranote 5, at 88-89; Spelliscy, supranote 5, at 164-68; DIXON, supra
note 149, at 239; Drumbl, supra note 4, at 1050; Stalin, supra note 4, at 47.
159. See BOOT, supranote 5, at 554. See also KERR, supra note 5, at 80-81; Hayden, supra
note 5, at 568.
160. See BOOT, supranote 5, at 554. See also KERR, supranote 5, at 80-81; Sass6li & Olson,
supranote 5, at 739; Hayden, supranote 5, at 568; Jinks, supranote 5, at 88-89; Spelliscy, supra
note 5, at 164-68; Linton, supranote 5, at 161-62; DIXON, supranote 149, at 239; Carillo-Suarez,
supra note 149, at 101-02; Drunbl, supra note 4, at 1050; Stahn, supra note 4, at 47.
161. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW, supranote 7, at 91-93.
See also Christine Byron, Armed Conflicts:Internationalor Non-International?,6 J. CONF. & SEC.
L. 63, 84-85 (2001).
162. See AKSAR, supranote 8, at 131-33; Greenwood, supranote 154, at 271-72.
163. Stewart, supranote 5, at 314.
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2. Minority View
In contrast, a minority of scholars argue that a conflict is not inevitable
between the ICTY and the ICJ on the question of state responsibility.'"
One scholar bases his belief in the lack of a conflict on Judge McDonald's
Tadic Trial Chamber dissent.'65 Generally, those scholars Who hold the
minority view praise her dissent as an appropriate rejection of the Trial
Chamber's reliance on Nicaragua." One scholar argues that both the
ICTY's overall control standard and the ICJ's effective control standard
are really manifestations of a "direction and control" standard and that,
consequently, those standards do not really conflict.'67
a. Minority View Generally
Though many scholars heap praise on Judge McDonald's analysis that
the Nicaraguastandard was actually met in Tadic,'6' some scholars also
mention that she believed that a lesser standard was the correct one. 69 The
discussion of this lesser standard is the crux of the minority view as the
true minority view holds that the different issues require different
standards.
b. Meron and Moir
Two scholars in particular, Judge Theodor Meron and Lindsay Moir,
argue that the Appeals Chamber's reasoning was incorrect. 7 ° Meron
argues that Judge McDonald's dissent is correct because: "even a quick
perusal of international law literature would establish that imputability is

164. Brown, supra note 151, at 382-85; Watson, supra note 151, at 877-78.
165. Brown, supra note 151, at 382-85.
166. Theodor Meron, Classification ofArmed Conflict in theFormer Yugoslavia: Nicaragua's
Fallout, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 236, 237 (1998); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw, Overlaps, Gaps, andAmbiguities, 8 TRANSNAT'LL. & CONTEMP.
PROBS.

199, 226-27 (1998).

167. Van Den Hole, supra note 8, at 279-85.
168. Brown, supra note 151, at 382-85; Meron, supra note 166, at 237.
169. Meron, supra note 166, at 237.
170. Id. at 236 (Judge Meron was a professor of law at New York University when he wrote
the material in question. He has since joined the ICTY and the ICTR as a judge.); LINDSAY MOIR,
THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFUCT

49-50 (2002).
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not a test commonly used in judging whether a foreign intervention leads
to the internationalization of the conflict."' Thus, Meron argues that the
issues in Tadic andNicaraguaare different enough to make it an7 error
for
2
the Appeals Chamber to criticize the ICJ's Nicaraguastandard.
Meron goes the furthest of any scholar when he argues that the Appeals
Chamber went down the wrong path in criticizing or even using the
Nicaraguastandard. 73 Meron argues that the ICTY's use ofthe Nicaragua
standard "produces artificial and incongruous conclusions."'7 Meron
makes this argument because he believes that:
this was not an issue of (state) responsibility at all. Identifying the
foreign intervenor was only relevant to characterizing the conflict.
Thus, the problem in the trial chamber's approach lay not in its
interpretation of Nicaragua,but in applying Nicaraguato Tadic at
all. Obviously, the Nicaraguatest addresses only the question of
state responsibility. Conceptually, 7it5 cannot determine whether a
conflict is international or internal.1
Meron is the only scholar who makes this argument as forcefully as he
does:
Indeed, even a quick perusal of international law literature would
establish that imputability is not a test commonly used in judging
whether a foreign intervention leads to the internationalization of
the conflict and the applicability of those rules of international
humanitarian
law that govern armed conflicts of an international
76
character.
Meron's discussion does not carry as much weight as it might, however,
because he77does not provide any reference or citation to the literature he
mentions.
Meron does provide his reader with significant criticisms of the Tadic
Appeals Chamber in Part IV of his work, in which he criticizes the Tadic
Appeals Chamber's inappropriate juxtaposition of the ICJ's discussion of

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Meron, supra note 166, at 239.
Id.; Bassiouni, supra note 166, at 226-27.
Meron, supra note 166, at 237; Bassiouni, supra note 166, at 226-27.
Meron, supra note 166, at 237; Bassiouni, supra note 166, at 226-27.
Meron, supra note 166, at 237; Bassiouni, supra note 166, at 227.
Meron, supra note 166, at 239.
Id.See also Bassiouni, supra note 166, at 226-27 (Bassiouni only cites to Meron).
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178
attributability in Nicaraguawith its conclusions on humanitarian law.
This criticism of the Appeals Chamber, however, is as far as he is willing
to go in drawing the distinction between the two standards at issue in the
respective cases.
Moir also criticizes the Appeals Chamber: "In what seems an
unnecessary (and indeed dubious) piece of reasoning, the Appeals
Chamber decided to use the test of 'overall control,' holding that the
'effective control' test, as used in the Nicaraguacase was not persuasive
,19 Moir goes on to argue, however, that the test used
for two reasons ....
by the Appeals Chamber reached the correct result. 0 She also argues that
the different bodies of law applicable to internal and international armed
conflicts may be converging.'8 ' She calls any remaining distinction
between the two bodies of law outmoded. 82

3. Discussion of the ILC's Articles and Draft Articles
The LLC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility are quite celebrated
in the academic literature. Very few scholars, however, have addressed the
question of whether the ILC's draft articles draw the appropriate
distinctions discussed in this Article. While many scholars take note of the
conflict,8 3 they do not take a position on the conflict, nor do they discuss

whether the ILC's Article Eight or the commentary to Article Eight
appropriately remedy the conflict. 4

178. Meron, supra note 166, at 240-41.
179. MOIR,supranote 170, at 49-50.
180. See id. at 50.
181. See id. at 5l .
182. Id.
183. See Gregory Townsend, State Responsibilityfor Acts ofDe FactoAgents, 14 ARIZ. J.
INT'L& COMP. L. 635,637-39 (1997). See also Danya L. Kaufinan, Don'tdo What ISay, Do What
I Mean!: Assessing a State's Responsibilityfor the Exploits ofIndividuals Acting in Conformity
with a Statementfrom a HeadofState, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 2603, 2610-12 (2002). See generally
Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, The ILC's State Responsibility Articles: Introduction and
Overview, 96 AM. J.INT'L L. 773 (2002); Shabtai Rosenne, State ResponsibilityandInternational
Crimes:FurtherReflections on Article 19 ofthe Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 30 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. &POL. 145, 145-51 (1998).
184. See Townsend, supranote 183, at 63 7-39. See also Kaufinan,supranote 183, at2610-12.
See generallyBodansky & Crook, supra note 183; Rosenne, supra note 183, at 145-51.
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IV. ANALYSIS

Any conflict between the ICJ and the ICTY over the appropriate
standard for determining when a conflict is international in character is a
superficial conflict based on a misunderstanding of the motivations of the
ICJ's use of the effective control standard in Nicaragua. In addition,
perhaps because of the ICTY's improper criticism, it articulates too high
a standard for determining when an armed conflict becomes
internationalized.
A. Different Goalsfor Nicaragua and Tadic
As the McDonald dissent, Meron, and the Prosecution in the Tadic
appeal attempted to convey to the Appeals Chamber, the goals of the
litigants in Nicaraguaand Tadic were different." 5 Nicaragua,on the one
hand wanted to attribute the actions of the Contras or the UCLAs to the
United States and make the United States liable for the violations of the
laws of war of both the Contras and the UCLAs. The Prosecution in Tadic
merely sought to hold Tadic and others responsible for grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions, which required a determination that the conflict
was international in character.
Indeed, the commentary to the Geneva Conventions indicates that the
reason the Geneva Conventions differentiated between international and
non-international armed conflicts was to provide greater protection to
combatants and civilians in non-international armed conflicts than was
available before the Geneva Conventions. 6 The goal was not to provide
explicitly lower standards for non-international armed conflicts.' 87 Most
of the commentary focuses on the delegates' concerns that including
internal conflicts in the Geneva Conventions would confer too much
recognition on terrorists or common criminals. 88 The concern does not
appear to have been that victims of atrocities in otherwise internal conflicts
deserve less protection than do victims of international armed conflicts. 89
185. As Judge Shahabuddeen recognized in his separate concurring opinion. United Nations,
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991,
Prosecutor v. Du[Ko Tadi], Case No. IT-94-1-A, July 15, 1999, at http://www.un.orglicty/tadic/
appeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf.
186. Jean Pictet (ed.), Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Times of War, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1960, First
reprint, Geneva, 1994 (commentary on Common Article III).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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Furthermore, the Tadic court made a leap in logic in arguing that
internationalization of a conflict for all purposes was necessary in order to
internationalize the conflict for the purpose of war crimes prosecutions.'
Thus, the ICTY's error was not grounded in any earlier distinction made
between international and internal armed conflicts.
Nor were its criticisms of the ICJ's heightened state responsibility
standard warranted. While a defense of the ICJ's effective control standard
is beyond the scope of this Article, the ICJ did have some compelling
reasons for ruling as it did. First, in the case of war crimes, genocide, or
crimes against humanity, attributing the actions of individuals guilty of
those crimes to a state would mean that the state is responsible for those
crimes. 9 ' When a state's army is directly guilty of war crimes, as was the
case with the Armies of Germany and Japan in World War II, this form of
attribution only makes sense. When, however, as was the case in
Nicaragua and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state only has nominal control
over the belligerents responsible for the crimes, attributing the actions of
those individuals to the state becomes much more problematic and vexing.
To attribute the actions of those belligerents to a state, a court would have
to hold that though a state did not give the order to commit the crime and,
in many circumstances, know that the crime occurred until after the fact,
the state is nonetheless responsible for criminal acts.'92
That is why, when addressing a question of whether a state is
responsible for the actions of an individual, the ICJ looked for specific
instances of orders by a state organ to that individual before it would
impute the actions of the individual to the state. For example, while the
United States certainly supported the aims of the Contras and contributed
money, equipment and man-hours to their cause, it is quite another thing
to say that the United States intended for the Contras to violate the laws of
war with that money or equipment, or directed or encouraged the violation.
Thus, unless Nicaragua could offer substantial proof of the United State's
desire for the Contras to conduct themselves in an illegal manner, a court

190. As Judge Shahabuddeen recognized in his separate concurring opinion.
191. Again, the ICJ does not have jurisdiction over individual criminal prosecutions, so the
question in front of the ICTY was never before it. See AKSAR, supra note 8, at 135.
192. It is possible that an individual could be found guilty of the crimes under a command
responsibility theory. In light of the fact, though, that such a command responsibility theory would
assume tremendous control over one's subordinates, to hold a state responsible for the actions of
individuals that it does not control in a manner akin to a commander who does control his or her
troops, would stretch the notion of state responsibility much further than the Articles on State
Responsibility intended, and much further than logic allows. In short, states cannot ever act in the

same manner as military commanders. Thus, any analogy between the two would be flawed.
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should be reluctant to attribute the actions of the Contras to the United
States.
One could certainly argue that the United States was negligent or
reckless in its support of the Contras, given that contributions of weapons,
money and training would likely lead to attacks on civilians. To hold that
the United States desired or even knew of attacks when they were
occurring, or that the United States wanted those attacks to occur without
specific evidence of that intent on the part of direct agents of the United
States, however, could lead to the United States being responsible for
specific intent war crimes that it did not even know were occurring. At
best, absent clear evidence to the contrary, one could assert that the United
States knew or should have known about the atrocities the Contras would
likely commit/were committing with the weapons they were given by the
United States. But, if an individual only had this sort of knowledge, a court
would not convict that individual of war crimes.'93 If an individual could
not be guilty of a war crime under the same circumstances, why should a
state be responsible for the crime? Indeed, if a state could be responsible
for a war crime for simply knowing about the likelihood of such a
transgression taking place, a court could be faced with the incongruous
result of holding a state responsible for a war crime without having
sufficient evidence to convict any individual of that same crime.
A potential counterargument is that in cases involving the actions of
government officials, soldiers of the state, and other people normally
associated with the state, the state is held accountable for the actions of
those people regardless of whether they were working within the bounds
of the state's law or the directions they were given. Why then should
international law require a higher standard for more informal arrangements
than it does for government officials? Why not assume the connection
exists?
The answer lies in the different degrees of formality between normal
government officials and private individuals that might be de facto state
actors. While it is certainly true that the Contras were, to some extent,
doing the bidding of the United States, and while it is also true that the
Bosnian Serb Army was operating with the approval of the FRY, the
necessary informality of those ties meant that that United States and the
FRY were not able to exercise the same degree of control over those
groups as one would expect those countries to have over their own direct
agents.

193. But see id.
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This lack of control over de facto agents means that to attribute the
actions of those agents to the governments of either country, absent a
finding of specific direction, would hold those nations to a standard where
they could be held accountable for actions that they might never condone
or tolerate among officials of their respective governments. In contrast, a
country normally has a very high degree of control over its agents and
soldiers. The specific direction and control over actions that the ICJ was
looking for in Nicaraguais assumed because it is normally present. The
above is not meant to imply that a state will or should be able to act
through proxies without legal sanction. Indeed, the ICJ found the United
States liable for a violation ofNicaragua's sovereignty and interference in
its affairs. Such a finding was, arguably, sufficient vindication of
Nicaragua's rights based on the evidence it was able to present.
The goal in Tadic was to determine if Tadic was guilty of crimes as laid
out in Article Two of the statute of the ICTY. That portion of the statute
only required that the war itself be international in character, not that those
who committed crimes be de facto organs of a party to the conflict. When
seeking to hold individuals accountable for their crimes, the concern of
whether the state endorsed or knew of the crimes becomes irrelevant.
In such a framework, a state connection does not necessarily imply that
the state is responsible for the crimes, merely that enough of a connection
exists to make the conflict international. While it would be true that if a
conflict could be imputed to a state such a conflict would be international
for the purposes of international war crimes prosecutions of individuals,
it does not follow that a state must be responsible for the actions of an
individual in order to successfully prosecute that individual for war crimes
committed in an international conflict.
The Appeals Chamber was, therefore, simply incorrect to criticize the
ICJ standard. Even if the Nicaraguaeffective control standard sets too
high of a bar in terms of state responsibility, the Appeals Chamber should
not have criticized that standard, because the two courts did not share the
same goals. The only question the Appeals Chamber needed to ask in
Tadic, and the only question it answered, was whether enough of a state
connection existed to the crimes in question such that those crimes could
be said to have occurred in an international context.
The ICTY is also guilty of another error in Tadic, heretofore not
discussed in the literature. The ICTY's error stems from its apparent belief
that either a conflict must be international in its entirety or it must be
internal in its entirety. In other words, to prosecute war criminals under the
grave breaches regime allowed by the ICTY statue for international war
crimes prosecutions, all aspects of the conflict must be international. The
ICTY adopts this implicit belief without discussing whether all aspects of
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the conflict would be international. For instance, in light of the ICTY
Appeals Chamber's decision in Tadic, would the Bosnian government
have been obligated to designate captured Serbian militia fighters as
prisoners of war? Was the conflict international for the purpose of
allowing Bosnia to invade Serbia proper in self defense due to the
connection between the Serbian militia and the Serbian government?
While it is entirely possible that the ICTY or another court might so find,
by painting the inquiry set before it with such a wide brush, the ICTY's
holding implies all of those results without explicitly deciding those
questions. In contrast, the ICTY could have limited its inquiry to ask
whether the conflict was international for the purpose of war crimes
prosecutions and fashioned a standard for internationalization that
identified only factors relevant to that inquiry. By attempting to go further,
the ICTY has stepped beyond its mandate and raised serious questions as
to the impact its ruling would have on other areas of law that it likely did
not even consider.
Thus, criticism of the ICTY's error has not gone nearly far enough. The
draft articles, though they head in the right direction, do not provide a clear
enough repudiation of the ICTY's rejection of Nicaragua. The draft
articles themselves on first read seem to open the door to a lower standard
for state responsibility than that adopted by the ICJ in Nicaragua.Though
the commentary does criticize the Appeals Chamber for addressing a
question that was not directly before it, the drafters should have gone
further and drawn the relevant distinctions between the two cases as well
as spelling out the reasons for those distinctions. Instead, the drafters were
content to adopt a limited view of the problem.
Judge Meron, Judge McDonald, and Judge Shahabuddeen appropriately
keyed into the major difficulty with the Tadic case, though all seemed to
have missed just how much the ICTY's analysis implied. Judge
McDonald's and Shahabuddeen's criticisms, additionally needlessly
further complicated the issue by arguing that the Prosecution had met the
burden of Nicaraguawhen the question of whether it had met that burden
was not relevant. If, Judge McDonald had dissented solely on the grounds
in the second part of her opinion and argued for a different standard, her
opinion would have more sharply drawn the distinction between the
internationalization of a conflict and the ability to hold a state accountable
for the actions of private parties. Instead, the opinion's imprecision
allowed the Appeals Chamber to compound the error.
Judge Meron goes further than Judge McDonald, but he too does not
provide nearly enough of a rationale to concretely establish his position.
Rather than addressing the majority opinion of the Appeals Chamber
directly, he refers to a survey of international humanitarian law literature
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that he then fails to cite. Though Judge Meron is right in the end, refutation
of the Appeals Chamber requires a more thorough analysis than the one he
provided.
B. Does the Overall Control Test Achieve the Goal of Determining
When a Conflict Becomes International?
In criticizing Nicaragua,the ICTY necessarily adopted a new standard
for determining when a conflict becomes international. Given that the
goals of the two courts were so different and need not conflict, one
wonders whether the overall control test developed in ICTYjurisprudence
achieves the goals of determining when a conflict has become international
in character. Most recently, the ICTY in Kordic and Cekez, held that two
criteria were necessary to establish overall control; first, whether a state
provided "financial and training assistance, military equipment and
operational support," and second, whether that state "[p]articipat[ed] in the
organisation, coordination or planning of military operations." 1" The
ICTY, though, has stressed that specific orders or command and control,
per the effective control standard, is not necessary to meet the second
prong of the test.
This standard of overall control is still too stringent a standard to
determine when an armed conflict is international in character for the
purpose of war crimes prosecutions. Instead, the appropriate standard of
control would be one that could be met by showing either the first or the
second prong of the ICTY's overall control test. If a state provides
financial and training assistance in addition to operational support to a
group, it stands to reason that the conflict has become international for the
purposes of war crimes prosecutions by virtue of the support offered by
that state.' 9 Similarly, if a state coordinates military activities with a
group, as the Trial Chamber found in Kordic and Cekez,' 9 by, for
194. Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cekez, supra note 116, 361, at 94.
195. In Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cekez, the Appeals Chamber focused on the evidence of
logistical support in terms of shipping military equipment, logistical communications support,
training assistance, medical assistance, uniforms, vehicles, and other supplies, and the payment of
salaries of militia members. See id. at 94-96.
196. To quote the Appeals Chamber:
371. Likewise, the Trial Chamber reasonably based its finding that Croatia
provided leadership in the planning, coordination and organisation of the HVO on
reliable evidence. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber considered
a multitude of factors when making its analysis. It not only assessed the broad
political context of President Tudman's territorial ambitions, but also included
several other elements in its analysis, such as General Bobetko's involvement and
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example, paying militia's salaries as well as coordinating its troop
movements and deployments to coincide with a militias activities, such
findings should be sufficient to internationalize a conflict for the limited
purpose of prosecuting war criminals.
Why then did the ICTY require both factors to find overall control?
Though the answer is unclear, a reasonable explanation is that the ICTY
was adopting a weakened version of the ICJ's effective control test. A
weakened effective control test would still require proof of logistical
support or training as well as some direction and control. When the need
to weaken the ICJ's effective control standard is eliminated, and when one
focuses solely on what is needed to determine when a conflict has become
international, it seems apparent that one factor or the other should be
sufficient to deem a conflict international for the purpose of war crimes
prosecutions.
While caution is necessary lest a test eliminate all distinctions between
internal and international conflict, and while commentators point out that
"most apparently 'internal' wars do, in fact, receive some kind of outside
' that fact does not mean that only using one factor of the
support,"197
ICTY's test to determine when a conflict is international in character will
make all conflicts international. The ICTY required specific and detailed
factual evidence to determine that a conflict was of an international
character, meaning that the ICTY implicitly believed that when a conflict
became international was a matter of factual degree. Small provisions of
arms or support by a foreign state to internal belligerents would probably
not suffice to internationalize a conflict. Substantial logistical support
probably would. Given that this inquiry is a fact intensive one, the line of
when a conflict becomes international and when it remains internal may
never be clear. That problem is difficult to solve with a legal test as it is,
necessarily, a fact driven inquiry, but it will not be solved by commingling
two distinct bodies of international law.
The standard proposed in this Article has several significant advantages
over the Appeals Chamber's formulation. First, two distinct areas of
international law need not be commingled. Second, crimes committed
during conflicts can be punished under the stricter grave breaches regime
of the Fourth Geneva Convention more easily under this weaker standard.
Thus, those scholars who call for a weakened standard for prosecution of

the payments made by Croatia towards the salary of Witness CW1, all of which
indicate Croatian involvement in the HVO's organisation.
Id.at 96.
197.

INGRID DETrER, THE LAW OF WAR 47
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international war criminals can be placated without undermining settled
ICJ jurisprudence and without risking finding a state liable for an action
that the state did not intend to occur. Additionally, the standard is limited
in that it addresses only the issue to which it is relevant. If the standard is
designed to determine when a conflict becomes internationalized for the
purpose of war crimes prosecutions, no danger exists that a court that uses
it will mistakenly address issues not before it as the Tadic court did by
implication.
A potential objection to the above formulation could come from the
idea that international law should hold states accountable for crimes
committed during their proxy wars and that separating the two inquiries
identified in this Article maintains too high of a standard for state
responsibility. The rebuttal to this objection remains that while states
should certainly be held accountable for unlawful intervention in another
sovereign's affairs, holding them liable for the acts of individuals
necessitates the use of the effective control standard under current
jurisprudence. If sufficient proof is unavailable to hold a state responsible
for the actions of individuals, let the blame remain with the blameworthy
party, the individuals that perpetrated the unlawful acts in the first place.
Furthermore, a state that fights a war via proxies is almost always guilty
of unlawful intervention in the affairs of another sovereign as the ICJ
found in Nicaragua. If a state violates another state's sovereignty by
waging a proxy war within that second state's borders, it is likely that the
state will suffer many of the same penalties it would if a court found that
the actions of the non-state actors were attributable to it. In light of these
arguments, it is difficult to see why scholars would rally around the Tadic
decision in their call for an easier test for state responsibility.
1. Comparing the Proposed Standard with the Tadic Standard
Because the ICC is currently investigating human rights abuses and
violations of the laws of war in the DRC, it appears likely that, at some
point, the ICC will be faced with the same question faced by the Trial and
Appeals Chambers of the ICTY. As was previously mentioned, the Statute
of the ICC also differentiates between international and internal conflicts;
therefore, in order to prosecute a war criminal under a grave breach
regime, the prosecution must prove that the conflict was, at the time the
crime was committed, international. Though specific cases are, at this
point, unavailable, as the prosecution for the ICC has only charged one
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person with war crimes and those charges are not relevant to this Article,' 98
hypothetical examples drawn from possible scenarios the ICC might
confront provide a useful vehicle for exploring how the ICTY's Tadic
standard and the standard proposed in this Article differ and overlap.
a. Scenario One: Both Prongs of Tadic Are Met
Assume for the purposes of this scenario that members ofthe RCD-ML

militia conduct an operation against a Lendu village. The purpose of this
mission is to destroy a local Hema dominated militia based in the village.

During the operation, members of the RCD-ML militia torch several
homes, shoot suspected militia members, and beat others in an attempt to
gather information about the rival militia's activities. The RCD-ML militia
members receive arms, ammunition, and equipment from the Ugandan
military to carry out their mission. In addition, they received their initial
training and instruction from Ugandan military commanders. Finally,
evidence in the record indicates that the RCD-ML commander met with
the local Ugandan military commander prior to the attack, that the
Ugandan troops in the region were moved out of the area of the village
before the attack, and that they remained outside of the village until after
the RCD-ML militia members had completed their operation. During the
attack, the RCD-ML militia commits war crimes against Lendu civilians.
Here, the RCD-ML militia members meet the criteria established in
Tadic; in other words, the RCD-ML militia members would be held to be
part of an international conflict for the purposes of a war crimes
prosecution. First, a foreign military provided "financial and training
assistance, military equipment and operational support." As was
previously mentioned, the RCD-ML members were trained by a foreign
military. A foreign military also provided arms, ammunition and
equipment for the mission. Such evidence would be more than enough to
satisfy the first prong of the Tadic standard as the support by the foreign
military was akin to the support provided the Serbian militia in Tadic.
Additionally, sufficient evidence exists that a foreign state
"[p]articipated in the organisation, coordination or planning of military
operations." The meeting between the RCD-ML commander in charge of
the operation and the local foreign military commander would, alone,
likely be enough for a fact-finder to infer, at the very least, coordination

198. See Press Release, International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I commits Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo for Trial (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_
details&id=220& Ifen.html (last visited Mar. 31,2007) (noting that the accused was charged with
using children as soldiers).
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of military activities. The additional fact that the foreign military in the
area left the village prior to the attack is further evidence of the RCD-ML
militia's coordination with the Ugandan military.
Because both prongs of the Tadic standard are met, under this scenario,
the standard proposed in this Article is also satisfied. This scenario might
seem unimportant at first glance, but when the slight factual changes
between this scenario and the other scenarios are taken into account, the
rationale for a lesser standard than that proposed by the ICTY in Tadic
becomes apparent and logical.
b. Scenario Two: Prong One of Tadic is Met
In this scenario, the RCD-ML operation described in scenario one takes
place again with the following differences. The Ugandan military still
provided the initial training and financing of the RCD-ML, and it provided
arms, ammunition, and equipment for the operation. There is also evidence
that the RCD-ML commander had, at one point met with Ugandan military
officers. The evidence in this case, however, does not provide for the
inference that the Ugandan military helped plan the attack or otherwise
coordinated troop movements in anticipation of the attack. As a result, the
evidence with respect to this attack would not support a finding that the
conflict was international for the purposes of war crimes prosecutions
under the Tadic standard. In contrast, because sufficient evidence exists to
meet the first prong of the standard in Tadic, the standard proposed in this
Article would be satisfied.
This scenario provides a critical example of the error of the ICTY in
Tadic while simultaneously showing the benefits of a lesser standard not
linked to state responsibility. The differences between this scenario and the
first scenario, in which the Tadic standard is met, are slight. The only
major difference between the two scenarios is the absence of direct
evidence of a coordination of troop movements or planning for the
operation in question. The absence of such evidence, though, as has been
argued above, is not truly relevant to determine when a conflict has
enough of an international component to hold the militia members
accountable for international war crimes. This author would submit that
this second scenario is, in a practical sense, no less international than the
first scenario for the purpose of prosecuting war criminals, especially
given that the only difference stems from the absence of direct
coordination with the military forces of a particular state. Such a
difference is not relevant to determine whether a militia is sufficiently
supported by another state so as to render the conflict international for the
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purpose of war crimes prosecutions in light of the significant influence and
support provided by a foreign state.
c. Scenario Three: Prong Two of Tadic is Met
In this scenario, members of the UPC attack a village in an attempt to
quell the formation of a rival political party. They are armed by another
militia group, which in turn was armed by a foreign state but without the
state's knowledge. Before the attack, the members of the UPC involved in
the attack meet with the Ugandan military to plan the attack. Prior to the
attack, the Ugandan military in the area of the village surround the village
and set up checkpoints to stop all traffic entering and exiting the village.
The Ugandan military abandons the checkpoints several hours after the
attack finishes.
In this scenario, the first prong of the Tadic standard is not met. No
government provided training, arms, ammunition, or financing for the
UPC directly. It seems odd, however, that in such a scenario the conflict
would be deemed other than international for the purpose of war crimes
prosecutions. A foreign state's military helped plan the attack and without
their checkpoints, in all likelihood, the UPC could not have carried out the
attack. The military of the state in question clearly intended that the attack
take place, and they helped ensure that it would succeed. Why, in such a
circumstance would a prosecutor not be able to prosecute the perpetrators
of the attack as international war criminals? Surely the concern that
bandits and terrorists would be unduly recognized is not implicated by the
facts of this hypothetical when a state's military coordinated its activities
with those that perpetrated atrocities. This author can posit no reasonable
rationale for denying a prosecutor the flexibility of prosecuting the
perpetrators under the international war crimes framework in a scenario
such as this. The standard proposed in this Article eliminates the above
concerns.
d. Scenario Four: Neither Prong of Tadic is Met
In this scenario, local Hema villagers take up arms against their Lendu
neighbors. Hema villagers, motivated by grievances over land ownership
decide to forcibly reclaim land they believe their Lendu neighbors stole.
Armed with pistols, and rifles stolen from an arms cache of the RDCGOMA, the Hema attack Lendu farms, killing many Lendu farmers and
their families. In addition, many Lendu women are raped during the attack.
The Ugandan military in the area are aware of the conflict but they do not
react to stop any of the violence.
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In this scenario, the conflict would not be internationalized under either
the Tadic standard or the standard advocated in this Article. First, no
evidence exists that the Hemas involved were trained, equipped, or
financed by a foreign state or army. The Hema villagers did take weapons
from an arms cache of the RDC-GOMA, which, in turn, likely got its arms
from a foreign government, but no foreign state intentionally provided the
Hema with the arms. In addition, the a foreign military did not coordinate
or help plan the attack. That military's inaction is not, alone, indicative of
any coordination. Because this scenario does not implicate either prong of
the Tadic standard, the standard proposed in this Article would also lead
to the conclusion that, for the purposes of war crimes prosecutions, the
conflict was not international.
The reason this scenario is important to explore is that it indicates that
the standard proposed in this Article does not cast too wide of a net in
defining the circumstances in which conflicts become internationalized for
the purpose of war crimes prosecutions. As was previously discussed, one
of the major objections to a lesser standard for the internationalization of
conflicts in war crimes prosecutions stems from the belief that if
prosecution for international war crimes becomes easier, conflicts that
would otherwise be considered internal under the Geneva Conventions,
might be deemed international thereby raising the standard of care owed
to rebel combatants. This scenario helps mitigate that concern.
Another concern is that if otherwise internal conflicts become
internationalized by a lesser standard for prosecution of war crimes, the
internationalization of such conflicts would lead to a broader recognition
of the rebel group, thereby undermining the flexibility of the sovereign in
effectively quashing internal revolts. Again, this concern is somewhat
lessened by the fact that the standard proposed in this Article is limited
only to determine when a conflict becomes international for the purposes
of war crimes prosecutions. The scenario mitigates any further concern
along those lines because the scenario shows that criminal or terrorist
conduct not part of an armed conflict would not be deemed suitable for
prosecution of war crimes under the standard proposed in this Article.
e. Scenario Five: Both Prongs of Tadic, Different States
As was mentioned above, the Ituri conflict, much like the conflict in the
DRC as a whole, is immensely complicated and involves shifting alliances.
In this scenario, a rebel group, originally trained, armed, and equipped by
the Ugandan military, switched allegiances and joins up with a proRwandan rebel group. This group attacks a local village in order to target
a rival militia. Prior to this attack, the local militia leader meets with
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Rwandan army officers where they plan the appropriate time and method
of the attack. In addition, the Rwandan army provides limited artillery fire
against Ugandan army regulars while this rebel group attacks so as to
distract Ugandan forces away from the targeted village.
This scenario highlights one of the potential problems the ICC could
face if it uses the Tadic standard. It is reasonably clear that a foreign state
helped arm, train, and equip the militia in question. It is also clear that a
foreign state helped plan the attack and coordinated its forces with the
militia. It is not clear, under Tadic, however, that the conflict was
international, because the Tadic standard implicitly requires that the same
foreign state be implicated in both prongs of the test. Despite the inability
of prosecutors to prove enough of a connection to attribute the actions of
the militia, in this case, to one state in particular, this scenario cries out for
international war crimes prosecutions due to the obvious connections to
multiple states by the perpetrators of the crimes. The standard proposed in
this Article, however, would allow the ICC to charge the militia members
with international war crimes. The flexibility and desirability of the
standard proposed in this Article in such a situation becomes readily
apparent. Such flexibility will likely become increasingly necessary as
conflicts involving multiple states become more common.
2. What These Scenarios Tell Us
As should be apparent from these scenarios, the standard proposed in
this Article meets all of the objectives of the Tadic standard without
suffering from some of its defects. It appropriately internationalizes
conflicts for the purpose of war crimes prosecutions in circumstances that
the Tadic standard does not, including a circumstance not envisioned by
the Tadic court. Simultaneously, the standard proposed in this Article is
not so broad as to catch common criminals or terrorists in its net. This
Article's standard also does not err by attempting to do too much. It does
not attempt to determine conclusively when an armed conflict has become
international for all purposes. Rather, it limits its scope to determining
when a conflict has become international for the purpose of prosecuting
war criminals.
Undoubtedly the standard proposed in this Article, like the Tadic
standard, is imperfect. It is this author's hope, however, that future courts
involved in war crimes prosecutions, particularly the ICC, even if they
decline to adopt the very standard proposed in this Article, will not, at the
very least, repeat the mistakes of the ICTY. If the ICC or another court
addressing war crimes prosecutions decides to head in a different
direction, it must remember its objective, fashion a test limited to that
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objective, and properly separate out irrelevant areas of law in designing the
new test. If a future court follows the above advice, whatever test it ends
up devising will certainly move this area of law in a positive direction.

V. CONCLUSION

The Appeals Chamber in Tadic created a conflict in international law
that split the scholarly community. While most scholars lauded the
Appeals Chamber's repudiation of the Nicaragua standard, a smaller
group of scholars questioned the wisdom of the Appeals Chamber's
finding. This smaller group, led by Judge Meron, appropriately focused on
the differences between the questions asked in Nicaraguaand in Tadic.
Yet, even those scholars did not provide a sufficient critique of the ICTY.
The differences between the two cases provide the key to showing why
the Appeals Chamber should not have rejected the Nicaraguastandard: it
was not truly implicated by the facts presented. The only question that the
Appeals Chamber needed to answer was whether the Yugoslavian conflict
was insufficiently international to use Article Two of the ICTY Statute. By
going further than that question and questioning the wisdom of another
court's standard not truly implicated by the facts of the case before it, the
ICTY created needless friction with other courts and engendered confusion
with regards to the condition of state responsibility law.
The irony of the dispute is that the ICTY did not need to create the
conflict in the first place. In addition, the lesser standard that it adopted
may still be too high to determine when a conflict has become
international. Future international war crimes prosecutions should not
make the ICTY's mistake of confusing different goals and should adopt a
standard that will simultaneously differentiate between international and
internal conflicts without imposing needless requirements borrowed from
other areas of international law.
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